[19991104]RS20390_核武器： Monitoring Warhead Dismantlement.pdf

1Graham T. Allison et al., Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy: Containing the Threat of Loose RussianNuclear Weapons and Fissile Material (MIT Press, 1996).Congressional Research Service The Library of CongressCRS Report for CongressReceived through the CRS WebOrder Code RS20390November 4, 1999Nuclear Weapons:Monitoring Warhead DismantlementKai-Henrik BarthAnalyst in Science and Technology PolicyResources, Science, and Industry DivisionSummaryConcerned about the security of nuclear warheads in the former Soviet Union, theClinton Administration sought ways to verify the elimination of non-deployed Russianwarheads. One approach, directed by the U.S. Department of Energy, is to developtechnologies to monitor the dismantlement of these warheads. Two constraints shapethese technologies. Monitoring technologies must give inspectors sufficient confidencethat a warhead is actually dismantled and that its components are not reused for newnuclear weapons. Yet, to protect nuclear weapon design information, inspectors mustnot be able to directly observe the disassembly of warheads or to conduct measurementson warheads that would reveal classified information. This report describes technologiesfor a poss